Higher Reason and Lower Reason by Uebersax, John S.
Higher Reason and Lower Reason 
 
John S. Uebersax 
 
 
Summary 
 
The word 'reason' as used today is used ambiguous in its meaning.  It may denote 
either of two mental faculties:  a lower reason associated with discursive, linear 
thinking, and a higher reason associated with direct apprehension of first 
principles of mathematics and logic, and possibly also of moral and religious 
truths.  These two faculties may be provisionally named Reason (higher reason) 
and rationality (lower reason).  Common language and personal experience supply 
evidence of these being distinct faculties.  So does classical philosophical 
literature, the locus classicus being Plato's Divided Line analogy.  
 
The effect of currently using a single word to denote both faculties not only 
produces confusion, but has had the effect of decreasing personal and cultural 
awareness of the higher faculty, Reason.  Loss of a sense of Reason has arguably 
contributed to various psychological, social, moral, and spiritual problems of the 
modern age.  This issue was also a central concern of 19th century 
Transcendentalists, who reacted to the radical empiricism of Locke. It would be 
advantageous to adopt consistent terms that make explicit a distinction between 
higher and lower reason.  One possibility is to re-introduce the Greek 
philosophical terms nous and dianoia for the higher and lower reason, 
respectively. This discussion has certain parallels with the recent theories of 
McGilchrist  (2009) concerning the increasingly left-brain hemisphere orientation 
of human culture. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Animal intelligence; Cognitive psychology; Conscience; dianoia; 
Epistemology; Higher reason; Intellect; Moral psychology; nous; Reason; ratio 
superior; rationality. 
Higher Reason and Lower Reason 
 
John S. Uebersax 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A certain ambiguity of the word 'reason' is the source of considerable confusion. 
Inasmuch as the use of reason is among the most important things we do as human 
beings, this is not something we wish to be confused about. Far from being a 
minor definitional issue, therefore, this subject is of great concern, as it relates 
vitally both to the ability of individuals to achieve their full potential as thinking, 
moral, and spiritual beings, and, at the collective level, to the integrity of culture 
and of social institutions.  
 
We can summarize the argument presented herein as follows: 
 
1. There are two distinct faculties or powers of the human mind which are 
currently referred to by the word 'reason'. 
 
2. Confusion between these two meanings – an inevitable result of having 
one word to designate two different things – has serious negative 
consequences, psychologically and socially. 
 
3. We can and should use two different words to denote these two things; 
for this we may potentially adapt existing English words, borrow terms 
from Greek philosophy, or invent new ones. 
 
The plan of this article is as follows.  The remainder of this section will describe 
the two mental faculties currently lumped together under the term, 'reason' and 
consider their unique natures and features.  The second section will consider in 
what ways the higher sense of 'reason' is related to our moral and spiritual nature.  
The third section will discuss the psychological and cultural importance of 
distinguishing the two faculties.  Fourth, the issue of alternative terminology will 
be addressed.  The final section contains some general conclusions and remarks. 
1.1 The distinction to be made 
 
We can establish the existence of a dual meaning of  'reason' in three ways: (1) 
from common language; (2) from the history of philosophy; and (3) from interior 
self-observation. 
 
The two meanings of 'reason' as found in common English usage are easily 
demonstrated.  The first meaning is implied in phrases such as "the light of 
Reason." As will see below, this meaning of 'reason' suggests an instantaneous 
state of mind, a certain clarity of thought, and specific categories of content.  We 
will provisionally name this mental faculty or power Reason. 
 
The second meaning of 'reason' is suggested by phrases like "she reasoned the 
problem out."  This implies a more deliberative, discursive thinking process. We 
shall provisionally name this faculty rationality, though we might equally well call 
it reasoning, ratiocination, or reckoning. 
 
An example will help verify that there is a genuine distinction to be made here. 
You may have on occasion found yourself in a heated discussion with an 
opponent, someone who perhaps argues very logically, but is argumentative or 
contentious.  To give an exaggerated example, a person of this sort might argue 
that it would be logical to place the homeless in workhouses, in order to reduce 
their burden on society.  The person might be very logical – presenting arguments 
methodically, supporting each premise and each step of reasoning with facts and 
figures, etc., and drawing conclusions according to the formal rules of logic.  The 
person might be 100% rational in the sense of arguing logically – yet you might 
well still consider the position, and the person him- or herself, unreasonable. This 
example shows that there is something about being reasonable that is distinct from 
merely being logical or rational. 
 
The second way to establish a difference between Reason and rationality is from 
the philosophical literature.  From the time of Plato onward, Western philosophers 
have used various pairs of terms to make precisely this distinction. The primary 
locus classicus is Plato's (429–347 BC) famous Divided Line analogy (Republic 
6.509d–513e).[1, 2]  There Plato distinguishes between a higher mental faculty 
associated with apprehension of unchanging, eternal truths (nous) and a lower one 
associated with fallible belief and the sensory world (dianoia).  We will return to 
Plato's Divided Line and these terms in Section 4. A similar distinction between 
nous as a faculty of immediate apprehension of truth and dianoia as a faculty of 
discursive thought or reckoning is found in Aristotle (384–322 BC) [3], in the 
Enneads of Plotinus (204–270 AD; founder of Neoplatonism) [4], and  
in the works of later Neoplatonists. [5]  
 
The terms ratio superior and ratio inferior, that is, literally, higher reason and 
lower reason, were used extensively in the Middle Ages [6], and continued a 
distinction made by St. Augustine (354–430 AD) [7]. 
 
Beginning with Middle Platonism and continuing in some Greek Patristic 
literature, the Stoic term hegemonikon, or ruling part of the soul, acquired 
meanings similar to those of nous.  Human nous as a faculty of higher reason and 
spiritual knowledge has been a continuous topic of discussion in Greek Orthodox 
Christian writing. [8] 
 
More recently a similar distinction is found in the work of Immanuel Kant.  Much 
more could be said about this, but these examples suffice as reference points in the 
philosophical literature and support the claim that there is a genuine distinction to 
be made here. 
 
A third way to demonstrate a distinction between Reason and rationality is to 
observe the operation of these two faculties (for simplicity we will hereinafter use 
the word 'faculty' to mean faculty, power, function, capacity or whatever other 
word may best apply) within ones own mental life.  This is left up to the reader to 
pursue as perhaps an ongoing experiment, and that will be potentially easier once 
this and the following sections are read.  Once one understands the basic 
distinction, it is easy enough to observe the operation of Reason and rationality. 
Indeed we use both routinely every day.   
 
1.2 Distinguishing Features of Reason 
 
We can explain the faculty of Reason in more detail by considering how we 
understand truths of geometry, mathematics, and logic. Three examples, one 
drawn from each domain, will illustrate.   
 
Example 1.  If one draws a line from one vertex of a triangle to the opposite side, 
one knows that the result is always to produce two triangles.  This result or 
conclusion is simply seen in the mind's eye.  One may perform the operation 
drawing on a piece of paper as an example, but understanding the universality of 
the principle – that it is necessarily true and applies to all triangles – is a purely 
mental operation. 
 
Example 2.  Consider how if one knows that X = Y and X = Z, then it 
automatically follows that Y = Z. 
 
Example 3.  In logic, if A implies B, and B implies C, then it necessarily follows 
that A implies C. 
 
For convenience we will refer to all three classes of such principles – geometric, 
mathematical, and logical – by the generic heading of mathematical first 
principles. Despite their simplicity, these examples reveal several important and 
even profound aspects of Reason: 
 
1. Truth.  Reason involves an apprehension, grasp, or recognition of some 
essential truth.  It recognizes irreducible first principles, sees the truth of 
self-evident truths.   
 
2. Immediacy. The apprehension of such truths occurs instantaneously.  We 
speak of a flash of insight; having such an experience we may suddenly 
exclaim, aha! 
 
3. Nondiscursiveness.  The manner in which Reason apprehends truth is 
more akin to immediate perception than to discursive thinking. Reason is 
thus often compared with vision.  We say of some new insight, "Now I see 
it."  We may speak of Reason as producing an insight.  
 
4. Immateriality. The conclusions or apprehensions of Reason do not 
depend on any material objects or sensory experiences. 
 
5. Absolute conviction.  The conviction of truths seen by Reason is 
absolute: the truth is considered universal, incontrovertible, and beyond all 
doubt.  It needs no support or corroboration from any outside source.   
 
6. Endurance. Once seen by Reason, a particular truth retains its familiarity 
in the mind.  It is as though one has mastered some new principle or skill, 
or arrived at an incrementally higher level of intellectual growth.  The 
insight might be temporarily forgotten, but, if so, it is generally more easily 
recovered than it was first attained. 
 
7. Consistency.  Not only is it never the case that two universal truths seen 
by Reason contradict each other, but we cannot even imagine how such a 
contradiction could occur.  Such a conflict of two truths seen by Reason is 
simply inconceivable to our minds. Similarly, we cannot imagine how any 
other sentient being could see by Reason anything opposite to what our 
own Reason informs us to be true. 
  
1.3 Distinguishing features of rationality 
 
We now consider an example of rationality.  Suppose someone asks you, "in 
summer, does it tend to be hotter at noon or in the afternoon?"  To answer this 
requires a sustained effort involving several mental operations.  Both inductive 
and deductive logic may be involved.  You might consult your memory for 
relevant scientific knowledge — for example, that the sun is highest in the sky at 
12:00 pm, so that at this time solar radiation arrives more perpendicular to the 
earth's surface and travels the least distance through the atmosphere, losing less 
energy.  But you might also consider how streets, buildings, and the air itself 
retain heat; therefore at say 2:00 pm, one might experience both direct heat from 
the sun and the stored heat radiating from streets and buildings, making it hotter 
then than at noon. You might further consult memories of hot days, or times when 
you've followed hourly temperature reports, and from all this conclude that, 
indeed, the hottest times are in the afternoon.   
 
Again, this practical example serves to illustrate several features of rationality. 
  
1. Discursiveness.  It is a discursive process, a deliberate effort to 'figure 
something out', arrive at a conclusion, or make a decision by a directed 
sequence of thoughts.    
 
2. Uncertainty. This faculty reaches only tentative, conditional conclusions. 
That is, at best, one is only probabilistically certain of any conclusion 
reached. The truth of a conclusion is conditional on the truth of the 
assumptions. Due to uncertain premises or evidence, even with a correct 
use of logic, incorrect conclusions are sometimes reached. 
 
3. Potential inconsistency.  Discursive reasoning concerning different 
questions may produce answers that contradict one another; or two people 
considering the same problem may arrive at different conclusions.  This 
doesn't bother us greatly, because there is no implicit expectation that 
discursive reasoning is perfectly reliable.   
 
4. Relies on sensory data.  Discursive reasoning depends on sensory data 
and material facts.    
 
5. Animal parallels. While it seems difficult or impossible to find animal 
analogs to human Reason, animals do possess abilities comparable to 
discursive reasoning. For instance, to a pet dog that has been previously 
trained, one might say "go fetch my slippers", make appropriate hand 
gestures, and so on, and eventually the dog 'understands' the command and 
acts.  In such cases we can and do meaningfully say that the dog 
understands the command. Often this understanding comes gradually, as it 
may take the dog a few moments to 'get' what we mean.   
 
As another example, consider giving some intelligent animal, say a crow, a 
complex problem where several sequential steps must be taken, say moving 
obstructing objects, to retrieve a piece of food. Intelligent animals can be 
observed to study such a situation beforehand, and then act in a way that 
indicates a thought-out plan. Again this implies that intelligent animals 
have something at least analogous to our faculty of discursive reasoning. 
[9] 
 
But we could not say the same thing in regards to the truths of Reason.  It 
would make no sense to say that a dog or a crow 'sees by Reason' that all 
triangles must always have three sides, or that two parallel lines can never 
intersect.  Thus, with regard to rationality one might suggest that humans 
differ from animals by degree (a quantitative difference), but our difference 
from animals in our possession of Reason is a difference in kind (a 
qualitative difference).  
 
It should be mentioned that often Reason and rationality interact or operate 
jointly. The construction of a sequential argument conforms to what we have 
called rationality.  But it is Reason which sees the correctness of a correct 
argument.  Thus there are two distinct processes involved – one discursive, and 
one being an immediate seeing of truth, entailment, or form. 
 
2. Reason as a Moral and Spiritual Faculty 
 
The above establishes with some plausibility the existence of a higher intellective 
faculty and a lower one, Reason and rationality, respectively.  
 
Over the centuries philosophers and theologians have often attributed to the higher 
faculty, Reason, not only the ability to recognize self-evident mathematical truths, 
but also truths of a moral and spiritual nature.  In the moral realm, Reason is thus 
understood as related to human conscience, or more specifically, to that part of 
conscience which recognizes universal moral truths.   
 
In the Middle Ages, this part of the mind was sometimes called synderesis (see 
Greene, 1991a,b;  Crowe, 1977, pp. 123–141).  There was some disagreement on 
the precise meaning of the term, but one common view was that synderesis is 
basically the same faculty we've called Reason, but applied to moral truths.  Some 
examples of self-evident moral truths apprehended by synderesis or Reason are: 
that there is a basic difference between good and evil; that we ought to do what is 
good; that human beings are morally accountable in ways that animals are not; and 
that humans have freedom of will — our choices are not mechanistically 
determined and utterly constrained.  
 
The Cambridge Platonist Benjamin Whichcote (1609–1683) called such self-
evident moral truths 'principles of first inscription', and summarized them as 
falling under the following headings: 
 
• reverence of Deity,   
• sobriety in the government of a man's own person,  
• moderate use of the pleasures of life,   
• righteousness and justice in transactions with others. 
 
(Campagnac, 1901, pp. 5-6). 
 
These self-evident moral truths seen by Reason are the basis of our moral life. 
They become, as it were, the first principles in logical syllogisms by which we 
deduce how we should act morally in specific cases.  An example of practical 
moral reasoning illustrates this: 
 
A. I ought to be just in dealing with others. (major premise) 
B. It is just to help the poor. (minor premise) 
C. I ought to help the poor. (conclusion) 
 
Here A, the first principle of the moral syllogism, is a self-evident moral truth seen 
by Reason and taken as certain.  B, a minor premise, is a supposition, rather than a 
universal truth (e.g., we can imagine conditions where it might not be prudent to 
help a poor person — e.g., if the person is poor because of their own negligence or 
vice).  To the extent that the minor premise is not universal, neither is the 
conclusion. 
 
A little reflection will show that we form practical moral syllogisms like this all 
the time, and that these determine many of our actions. 
 
In addition to self-evident moral truths, the religious literature, and especially that 
pertaining to religious mysticism, suggests that we may also be able to apprehend 
truths of a more strictly spiritual nature.  William James, in his Varieties of 
Religious Experience (p. 380), noted as a common characteristic of religious 
mystical experiences that they are "states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed 
by the discursive intellect." He also observed that an experience of this kind is 
often ineffable, that is, "no adequate report of its contents can be given in words." 
(Ibid.) These characteristics would place such experiences outside the realm of our 
discursive intellect, rationality, and connect them with Reason.  
 
Examples of spiritual truths reportedly 'seen' by mystics include that God is 
absolute Truth, that God is Love, that there are three distinct Persons of the Holy 
Trinity, etc.  
 
We have thus identified three potential classes of self-evident truths apprehended 
by Reason:  mathematical, moral, and spiritual truths.  While all, potentially, are  
seen by a common faculty, Reason, certain differences among them are also 
evident.  One salient difference is that, whereas mathematical truths can be 
brought to awareness more or less at will, the ability to see moral truths depends 
on the state of the observer; when one is, say, preoccupied with worldly affairs, it 
may not seem immediately self-evident that one should worship God.  Certain 
deep spiritual truths, such as God's glory, may simply overwhelm or even frighten 
us — such that we may intentionally avoid seeing them.  Or, if a moral truth 
causes us inconvenience, we may wish to avoid it.   This is generally not the case 
with mathematical truths.  Hence, while we suggest that there are important 
similarities among mathematical, moral, and spiritual truths, and that potentially 
all are apprehend by a common mental faculty, Reason, we also acknowledge the 
possibility of differences among these categories of truths, but do not here try to 
account for these differences. [10] 
 
3. Why This Matters 
 
We are today, and have been for some time, in what may be called a crisis of 
modernity.  It reached especially intense levels in the 20th century, as evidenced 
by, for example, two world wars, genocides, and a nuclear arms race.  In the 21st 
century the crisis continues, manifested by global warming, economic breakdown, 
perpetual war, dysfunctional governments, and other indicators too many to list.  
 
To philosophers, psychologists, and intellectual historians, at least, it would not 
seem implausible to suggest that this crisis of modernism is connected to 
epistemology – in our views about what counts for knowledge, and by what modes 
genuine knowledge may be acquired.  One central feature of modernism has been 
to radically restrict what counts for valid knowledge.  Only data that come from 
the five external senses (or measurements that convert unobserved phenomena into 
sense data) are considered acceptable for true or scientific knowledge. Whatever is 
not amenable to investigation or falsification by experimental means is rejected. 
 
It is not difficult to see the inadequacy of this view.  If this radical positivist 
world-view were correct, we would have to deny the reality of everything we hold 
dearest as human beings.  We would, for example, have to deny the reality of 
human love, except perhaps as a certain pattern of physiological responses. 
Religion would have no meaning other than, at best, a pleasant illusion. The 
ultimate outcome of the positivist worldview is fatalism and nihilism.  But 
regardless of what positivist dogmas assert, most human beings, as individuals, 
have a broader view of life and existence. We are, each of us, privately romantics, 
intuitionists, and moralists, and most are theists. 
  
The positivist worldview places an exclusive emphasis on rationality.   Reason, as 
a non-discursive intellective function distinct from rationality, has no place in the 
positivist universe.  As a consequence, over roughly the last 300 years, as 
empiricism, materialism, and positivism have come to dominate, the word 'reason' 
has come more and more to lose any connection with the higher faculty of Reason, 
and to mean only rationality. 
 
When no common terms exist that remind us of a higher intellective faculty, and 
of our spiritual and moral powers, our attention to these as existential and 
phenomenological realities is diminished.  Lacking a precise term for Reason, as 
distinct from rationality, the former concept vanishes from our literature, our 
conversations, our institutions. And insofar as Reason is the gateway to our higher 
nature, this semantic limitation contributes to a despiritualization and 
dehumanization of society. This is the plight of modern culture.  
 
A deep concern about the loss of a distinct term and concept corresponding to 
Reason is not new. This was a central concern of the 19th century 
Transcendentalist movement, which began, at least in part, as an attempt to 
counter the influential materialist-rationalist philosophy of John Locke and others.  
The New England Transcendentalist James Marsh, in the Preliminary Essay of his 
1829 American edition of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's religious and psychological 
work, Aids to Reflection, quoted a correspondent as having written him (Marsh): 
 
"If you can once get the attention of thinking men fixed on his [Coleridge's] 
distinction between the reason and the understanding, you will have done 
enough to reward the labour of a life. As prominent a place as it holds in 
the writings of Coleridge, he seems to me far enough from making too 
much of it." (Marsh, Preliminary Essay, Aids to Reflection, 1829, p. xliii) 
 
Here the words "reason" and "understanding" are meant in essentially the same 
way that we have used Reason and rationality, respectively.   
 
In his own preface to Aids to Reflection, Coleridge announced one of its principal 
aims as being: 
  
To substantiate and set forth at large the momentous distinction between 
REASON and Understanding. Whatever is achievable by the 
UNDERSTANDING for the purposes of worldly interest, private or public, has 
in the present age been pursued with an activity and a success beyond all 
former experience.... But likewise it is, and long has been, my conviction, 
that in no age since the first dawning of Science and Philosophy in this 
Island have the Truths, Interests, and studies that especially belong to the 
Reason, contemplative or practical, sunk into such utter neglect, not to say 
contempt, as during the last century. (Coleridge, Preface, Aids to Reflection, 
p. lix) 
 
The deliberately chosen words "momentous distinction" were not meant as 
hyperbole; they show the great importance that Coleridge and Marsh attached to 
the distinction between Reason and rationality.  The publication of the American 
edition of Aids, including Marsh's essay, is considered a watershed event in the 
emergence of American Transcendentalism.  It made a great impact on the young 
Ralph Waldo Emerson and many other New England intellectuals of the time. 
 
Why did not only Coleridge, but also Marsh, Emerson, and indeed the whole 
American Transcendentalist movement consider this so important?  At issue was 
the widely perceived need to counter the dehumanizing forces set in motion by 
radical Enlightenment-era empiricism, including the oppressive economic, social, 
and environmental results of the Industrial Revolution.  The writing was already 
on the wall at this point concerning a great confrontation between a dehumanizing 
materialism based on a radically rationalist-empiricist worldview, and a more 
encompassing view of human nature.  Are we merely intelligent animals, all our 
thoughts and actions mechanistically determined, or does the human soul contain 
something more, a spark of divinity?  This was the crucial issue the 
Transcendentalists confronted.  And at the bottom of this is a question about 
epistemology:  is what we may truly know merely the result of logical operations 
made on sense data, as Locke and the rationalists would have it, or are we also 
able to know things by extra- or supra-rational faculties?  
 
This is why it was important to recognize the existence of Reason as distinct from 
rationality.  From Locke onward, the term 'reason' had begun to be used 
indiscriminately, referring to both higher and lower reason.  Consequently the two 
faculties were not only being confounded, but the higher faculty, Reason, was 
being lost sight of:  
 
"the misfortune is, that the powers of understanding and reason have not 
merely been blended and confounded in the view of our philosophy, the 
higher and far more characteristic, as an essential constituent of our proper 
humanity, has been as it were obscured and hidden from our observation in 
the inferior power." (Marsh, Preliminary Essay, Aids to Reflection, pp. 
xxxviii–xxxix) 
 
Marsh explains that the distinguishing attributes of our humanity are associated 
with "that image of God in which man alone was created" and include "reason and 
free-will."  These, which are explicitly denied by Locke and the popular 
philosophy of the day, are "what constitutes the truly spiritual in our being." (Ibid., 
p. xliii) If we have no higher Reason and free will, there is no qualitative 
difference between us and animals that speaks to our peculiar dignity and rights as 
human beings.  
 
Neither is there, Marsh continues, any point to philosophy. The very essence of 
philosophy is a search for "truths of vast concernment" that are "living at a great 
depth, which yet no man can draw for another." (Ibid., p. l)  To deny the existence 
of valid knowledge that does not depend on external sense data would render us 
unable to notice, consult or reflect on "the movements of our inward being" or 
pursue that ancient and deep philosophy which is implied by "the heaven 
descended gnothi seauton" [know thyself]. (Ibid., p. li) A narrow emphasis on 
rationality diminishes our ability and motivation to attend to and "unfold those 
deeper and more solemn mysteries of our being. (Ibid., p. lii) 
 
4. The Desirability of Having Two Separate Terms 
 
If indeed what we have been discussing are two different faculties, clearly it would 
be advantageous to denote them with two distinct terms.  To appreciate this, 
suppose we had only one term 'hand-arm' to refer to both the hand and the arm.  
This would pose a significant obstacle to effective communication about activities 
that involve use of the hand or arm individually, say, sports or manual labor.  If 
one said, "open the door with your hand-arm", the meaning would be unclear. This 
is the difficulty we face by using one word, 'reason', to mean two different 
faculties. 
 
Should we propose to make the tentative terms used here, Reason and rationality, 
permanent?  This is a possibility, but has potential problems. Both words derive 
from a common Latin stem, ratio, making them not only cognates themselves, but 
also related to a host of other terms derived from ratio.  This would invite 
continued confusion.  Further, both words have such a long history of use and so 
many different senses that to try to arbitrarily impose a specific canonical meaning 
on them seems futile. 
  
There is precedent for using terms like 'Intellect,' 'Intellection', or 'Intelligence' (as 
in 'the Intelligence')  to denote what we have called Reason. But again these words 
– which all derive from the Latin word intelligere – are, as used today, ambiguous 
and have various senses quite different from Reason.  For example, we speak of 
such things as animal, machine, or military intelligence. 
 
An alternative is to return to two Greek words traditionally used to make more or 
less the same distinction as we are aiming at.  Specifically, for what we've called 
Reason some Greek philosophers used the word nous, and, for rationality, the 
word dianoia.  A standard source for this distinction, as already noted, is Plato's 
Divided Line analogy.  Plato's terminology there, as is well known, is none too 
clear, and he actually uses a variety of terms.  But while there is some 
disagreement as to their precise meaning (see e.g., Peters, 1967; pp. 122–128), 
over the centuries these two terms, nous and dianoia, have tended to acquire 
meanings that correspond to Reason and rationality. [11, 12]  
 
Given the term nous as the faculty of Reason, we would also get the verb noesis to 
denote the activity of nous, or the actual apprehension of truths, and the adjective 
noetic. [13] Modern writers have tended to use dianoia as both a noun to denote 
the faculty of discursive thinking ('the dianoia'), and as a verb to denote its 
operation.  There is some precedent, however, for using dianoesis as the verb 
form. 
  
Our proposal, therefore, is to adopt nous and dianoia to denote what we have 
herein called Reason and rationality.  These Greek terms have the advantage of 
being new to most modern readers, so that they do not carry numerous other 
senses, and they connect the distinction between Reason and rationality with a 
comparable one made by Plato, Aristotle, and later philosophers.  We present this 
proposal, however, in a speculative way, i.e., to stimulate further thinking, rather 
than to insist that this is the best solution. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Here we have done the following:  (1) posited the existence of  two distinct mental 
faculties associated with the word 'reason', calling them rationality (discursive 
reasoning or ratiocination) and Reason (an immediate apprehension of truth);  (2) 
suggested that Reason may apprehend not only mathematical and logical, but also 
moral and spiritual truths; (3) argued that the modern confounding of these two 
meanings has contributed to a disproportionate cultural emphasis on the empirical 
and scientific, and a corresponding undervaluing of the moral and spiritual nature 
of man; and (4) proposed the remedy of using separate terms to make more 
explicit the distinction between these faculties.  We now consider certain more 
general implications of this problem. 
 
5.1 Other ambiguous terms 
 
Today we are adept at developing scientific terminology to describe the exterior 
world, whereas our vocabulary for describing internal experience is comparatively 
impoverished.  A limited  vocabulary for internal experience leads to our using 
single terms with multiple senses, which invites confusion, as is seen with the 
word 'reason'.  Other important examples include the following: 
 
Wisdom can mean either skilled practical judgment or a higher, more spiritual and 
philosophical faculty.  In Greek, the terms phronesis and sophia, respectively, 
distinguish these two forms of wisdom.  In English, the words prudence and 
sapience, respectively, express the same distinction, but are losing currency. [14] 
 
Conscience has a range of meanings in modern usage, including (1) a Freudian 
super-ego, (2) a nagging voice of self-recrimination after wrongdoing, (3) a 
faculty for distinguishing good from bad, and (4) a motive force that urges one to 
do good. 
 
Intuition can mean a vague gut feeling or 'inkling', or specific nonverbal 
knowledge gained by introspection. 
  
Faith has many meanings, a fact particularly problematic given its fundamental 
importance to religion.  Its meanings range from blind credence, to a supra-
rational modality of knowledge.  There is also the 'faith that moves mountains', 
suggesting a force of conviction of such a nature that it might even shape reality. 
 
Will can mean either (1) determination or willpower, (2) ones wish, desire, or 
predilection (as in "what is your wish?"); or (3) the entire apparatus of the mind 
concerned with desire, judgment, choice, volition, and action. 
 
Heart, as a psychological term, can mean (1) the seat of emotions, or (2) the core 
of our being – something more fundamental than thought and emotion, such as the 
One of Neoplatonism, of which Mind and Soul are emanations.  (Uebersax, 2012 
empirically examines the multiple psychological senses of heart in the Bible.) 
 
These examples demonstrate the extent of terminological ambiguity associated 
with some of the most important existential, moral, and religious aspects of human 
nature.  Such ambiguity would be unacceptable in physical sciences, where terms 
like 'gravity' and 'electromagnetism' have very precise meanings. The tremendous 
technological progress of the last century has been made possible by harnessing 
the near-miraculous power of collective human activity.  Can we do the same 
thing in psychology?  A prerequisite would appear to be a shared, precise 
vocabulary. 
 
Why is our  epistemological and psychological vocabulary currently so primitive? 
Does it reflect some inherent difficulty in approaching phenomenology 
collaboratively and scientifically?  While it is potentially more difficult to develop 
consensual terms to denote interior experiences, which are by definition private, it 
is by no means impossible.  As human beings our experiences are mostly the 
same.  Similar conditions produce similar experiences in different individuals.  We 
can identify with some accuracy the inner state of another by means of their facial 
expressions and the like.  Hence even though two people cannot experience one 
another's mental states directly, they are still able to agree on terms to denote their 
private experiences. 
 
Therefore the paucity of precise terms in phenomenology and epistemology is 
perhaps more due to cultural biases, lack of attempts, or insufficient motivation.  It 
has certainly not helped that, in the centuries-old antagonism between materialism 
and idealism, our present culture is in an intensely materialistic phase (see e.g., 
Sorokin, 1985).   Our educational, commercial, and civil institutions emphasize 
materialism, and idealism as an organized force in society today is all but absent. 
 
However we are able to look back to the literature of earlier times for help.  The 
Greek philosophical tradition from Plato to Proclus spans nearly 900 years (much 
longer if we include the earlier pre-Socratics and later Byzantine and Orthodox 
philosophers) and is an incredibly rich source of epistemological and 
psychological terminology, little studied today. [15] If we were to re-introduce 
Greek classics into the undergraduate curricula of our universities, older 
philosophical terms might find their way into common use where corresponding 
English terms are lacking.  In any case, it seems particularly unwise that we 
continue to train psychologists without exposing them to Plato, Aristotle, or 
Diogenes Laertes.  While this statement might seem arbitrary or even petulant to 
some, it will seem obvious and natural to any who has read these classical authors. 
 
5.2 Brain hemisphere specialization 
 
There might also be evolutionary factors at work.  McGilchrist (2009) has recently 
drawn much needed attention to the division of cognitive specialization between 
the hemispheres of the human brain, and to important cultural implications of this 
division.  Basically, the left hemisphere of the human brain is more specialized for 
speech and linear reasoning, while the right hemisphere is more specialized for a 
kind of holistic, intuitive kind of knowing (for left-handed people the arrangement 
may be reversed).  In this scheme, the left brain hemisphere seems more closely 
associated with rationality.  We have much less basis, however, to associate 
Reason uniquely with the right brain hemisphere; nevertheless there are useful 
parallels between McGilchrist's theories and our discussion. 
 
McGilchrist relates left-hemisphere rationalism to a parable of Nietzsche, in which 
an emissary sent to represent a ruler usurps the latter's authority.  So too, human 
rationality has certain valid practical functions, but also a tendency to dominate or 
submerge other equally or more important faculties.  Our rational mind has a vital 
function to play, but it is neither our entire self, nor necessarily our deepest, 
wisest, or most authentic self. 
 
An interplay of genetic and cultural evolution, McGilchrist argues, has produced a 
radically orthophilic (left-hemisphere dominant) culture [16] – a source of myriad 
psychological and social problems – which we must seek to balance.  More 
specifically, what is needed is to better integrate the left- and right-hemisphere 
functioning of the brain and their respective associated worldviews to effect a 
harmony between them.  
 
In the same way we need today to better integrate rationality and Reason, at both 
the psychological and cultural levels. One way of seeing the current task is to 
explain to our highly developed rationalistic mind the nature and function of 
Reason. Without dedicated terms, it is difficult or impossible to organize our 
discursive thinking about our inner experience.  Thus, improving our terms and 
vocabulary for Reason, and for various intuitive means of knowing, is a central 
task in this process of integration and evolution of consciousness. 
 
5.3 Final remarks 
 
Finally, it may be noted that the present discussion fits with recent suggestions that 
faculty psychology is not necessarily obsolete (e.g., Howe, 2009 and references 
therein).  Faculty theory evolved precisely because it is how human beings view 
their own psychological functioning.  Traditional faculties like reason, will, and 
memory are phenomenologically and pragmatically valid constructs.  Modern 
scientific discoveries, while they have certainly increased our understanding of 
brain physiology, have supplied nothing to take their place. 
 
The skeptical philosopher Sextus Empiricus prefaced one of his works with words 
to the effect that "and if what is said here is not exactly true, then something of the 
same sort is meant."  These are fitting words to close the present study.  While 
perhaps it may not prove to be complete and correct in every detail, it is given 
more in the hope of being correct in its broad outlines.  In any case, an attempt has 
been made to approach the subject methodically.  What is true may be retained 
and elaborated on; whatever is incorrect can be dismissed, or perhaps may 
stimulate others to improve upon it in a cumulative and scientific manner. 
 
Notes 
 
1. Cf. Plato, Letters 7, 341ff.   
 
2. A complete historical review of the distinction between higher and lower reason 
would an immense – though perhaps an immensely valuable – undertaking.  The 
purpose here is more modest: to supply sufficient evidence to show the plausibility 
of the distinction, and to suggest it is important enough to warrant scientific study 
today.   Much more detail on the development of this distinction may be found in 
the sources listed in the Bibliography and the citations they contain.  
 
3.  Nicomachean Ethics 6 (cf. discussion of contemplation [theoreia] in Book 10); 
De Anima 3.4–8, Posterior Analytics 2.19, and in Metaphysics.  See Burnyeat 
(2008), Biondi (2004), and Frede (1996). 
 
4. See Sorabji (2005) and Wallis (1976). 
 
5. For examples see Sorabji (2005) and Steel (1997).  Neoplatonists see the higher 
reason as a faculty for apprehending Platonic Forms.  Mathematical, moral, and 
various other Forms are collectively called 'intelligibles'.  A distinctive feature of 
Neoplatonic epistemology is that the human mind is believed to contain a 
complete repertoire of  copies or images of all intelligible Forms (Steel, 1997).  
This is tantamount to saying that anything any human being could discern by the 
intellect already exists in at least latent form in the mind of every person.   
 
6. Mulligan (1955); Crowe (1977). 
 
7. De Trinitate 12. Augustine's term for higher reason is ratio sublimior.  Cf. 
Boethius' contrasting of reasoning (ratiocinatio) and  intellect (intellectus) in 
Consolatio 4.6.17. 
 
8. See for example Chryssavgis (2004), Louth (2007), and Williams (2007). 
 
9. On nearly the same day this paper was completed, an episode of the television 
series Nova, titled 'Ape Genius', was broadcast with remarkable scenes of 
chimpanzees fashioning spears for predation.  Comments by one interviewed 
scientist implied that such behavior demonstrates that reason is not unique to 
human beings. This inference, however, rests on failure to conceptually 
distinguish ratiocination from Reason. Precisely this problem is addressed in 
Section 3 here. 
 
10. We have taken a conservative approach to delineating the functions of higher 
reason. 
Aristotle and Neoplatonists attributed to nous additional functions, including the 
ability to apprehend the essential meanings of words, principles, or relations 
generally, or even what distinguishes one animal species from another (Burnyeat, 
2008; Steel, 1997).  In Patristic and later Greek Christian writing, nous has 
additional spiritual functions, viz. it is the principle faculty of religious knowledge 
and experience (Chryssavgis, 2004; Williams, 2007; Romanides, 2008) and the 
image of God in the human soul. Intellect, more or less a synonym for Reason, is 
often understood as the seat of insight, self-consciousness, and reflective 
awareness (Maher, 1910). 
 
11. According to some interpretations of Plato's Divided Line (Republic 6.509d–
513e), dianoia applies to mathematical reasoning only, and not to discursive 
reasoning generally.  This is a controversial point (Peters, p. 124, 'noesis', par. 10).  
It suffices for our purposes to suggest that interpreting dianoia as discursive 
reasoning as distinguished from immediate noetic apprehending has ample 
precedent. 
 
12. We could arguably justify using the Greek word logizomai or some other 
cognate of logos to denote the faculty of rationality.  However logos already has 
so many other meanings that using such a term might only invite further 
confusion. 
 
13. If the means by which we apprehend moral and spiritual truths are different 
from how we see mathematical truths, we might denote all by the collective term 
noetic faculties. 
 
14. But perhaps they could be revitalized; we may add this to the suggestions 
made in the preceding section. 
 
15. I have catalogued nearly 400 such terms in classical sources even without 
making a systematic effort to locate them. 
 
16. The left brain hemisphere is associated with the right side of the body. 
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